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Abstract This paper investigates the relationships between identity-based non-interactive
key distribution (ID-NIKD) and identity-based encryption (IBE). It provides a new security
model for ID-NIKD, and a construction that converts a secure ID-NIKD scheme satisfying
certain conditions into a secure IBE scheme. This conversion is used to explain the relation-
ship between the ID-NIKD scheme of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara and the IBE scheme of
Boneh and Franklin. The paper then explores the construction of ID-NIKD and IBE schemes
from general trapdoor discrete log groups. Two different concrete instantiations for such
groups provide new, provably secure ID-NIKD and IBE schemes. These schemes are suited
to applications in which the Trusted Authority is computationally well-resourced, but clients
performing encryption/decryption are highly constrained.
Keywords Identity-based encryption · Identity-based non-interactive key distribution ·
Trapdoor discrete logs
Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation (2000) 94A60
1 Introduction
The concept of identity-based cryptography (IBC) was ﬁrst introduced by Shamir [35].
In IBC, arbitrary identifying strings such as e-mail addresses or IP addresses can be used to
form public keys for users, with the corresponding private keys being created by a trusted
authority (TA) who is in possession of a system-wide master secret. Then a party Alice
who wishes, for example, to encrypt to a party Bob needs only know Bob’s identiﬁer and
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the system-wide public parameters. This approach eliminates certificates and the associated
processing and management overheads from public key cryptography.
Shamir [35] was able to construct an identity-based signature scheme, but the ﬁrst fully
secure and efﬁcient identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes were not forthcoming until
much later [6,34]. Since then there has been an explosion of interest in IBC and the related
ﬁeldofcryptographybasedonpairings.AmajoropenprobleminIBChasbeentoconstructan
efﬁcientIBEschemewhosesecurityisnotbasedonhardnessassumptionsinpairing-friendly
groups(c.f.[32]).AcandidatesolutionistheCocksIBEscheme[11],whosesecurityisbased
on the hardness of the quadratic residuosity problem modulo an RSA composite N. But this
scheme suffers from ciphertext expansion. More recently, Boneh et al. gave an IBE scheme
with security also based on the quadratic residuosity problem [7]. This scheme has short
ciphertexts but rather large private keys, and both the encryption and decryption algorithms
require non-trivial computational effort. An entirely different approach to IBE, based on
lattices, was recently introduced by Gentry et al. [16]. Their IBE scheme enjoys efﬁcient
encryption and decryption, but has large public parameters and private keys. It also remains
to be seen how parameters should be selected in practice for this scheme in order to attain a
given level of security.
In a separate strand of work that pre-dates the pairing-based approach to IBE, Maurer
and Yacobi [25–27] explored the use of special RSA moduli to construct groups in which
knowledge of trapdoor information makes the discrete log problem (DLP) in the group eas-
ier to solve than when the trapdoor is not available. They used these groups to construct
identity-based non-interactive key distribution (ID-NIKD) schemes. Such a scheme allows
two entities who have each receiveda private key from a TA to computea shared key without
exchanginganymessages;thiskeycanthenbeusedtoderiveakeyforsymmetricencryption,
for example. According to [29], around the same time, Murakami and Kasahara adopted a
similar approach as Maurer and Yacobi. Unfortunately, the schemes of Maurer and Yacobi
have a somewhat troubled history, with a series of attacks and ﬁxes having been presented
f o rt h e m[ 26,24,27,21,29]. Put simply, none of the schemes in [25–27] are secure in any
reasonable security model for ID-NIKD, a situation that is yet to be rectiﬁed. Moreover,
these schemes are not actually IBE schemes. This is because there is a subtle but important
distinction between IBE and ID-NIKD: in the former, any party can send Bob an encrypted
message knowing only Bob’s identiﬁer and the system parameters, while in the latter, both
parties need to be enrolled in the system and in possession of their private keys in order to
establish a shared key for encryption.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, we revisit the early work of Maurer and Yacobi, investigating how general
trapdoor discrete log (TDL) groups can be used to obtain ID-NIKD and IBE schemes. Our
historical perspective allows us to shed light on the relationship between the ID-NIKD and
IBE primitives. It also allows us to obtain new, provably secure IBE schemes that provide
a different set of trade-offs between efﬁciency and bandwidth consumption compared to
existing schemes.
WebeginbyestablishinganewsecuritymodelforID-NIKDthatmoreaccuratelycaptures
the security desired from this primitive. Our new model is stronger than the existing model
of Dupont and Enge [13] and is inspired by earlier models for (interactive) authenticated
key exchange [2,5,3,9]. Since ID-NIKD is itself a very useful cryptographic primitive with a
widerangeofapplicationsincryptography(seeforexample[37,8,1]),ournewmodelshould
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be of independent interest. We show that the well-known ID-NIKD scheme of Sakai et al.
[33] is secure in our model, thus strengthening the main result of [13].
Our next contribution is to show how to construct a secure ID-NIKD scheme from any
TDLgroupG,undertheassumptionsthattheComputationalDifﬁe-Hellman(CDH)problem
is hard in G and that there exists an efﬁcient hash function H1 :{ 0,1}∗ → G.T h i sh a s h
functionismodelledasarandomoracleinoursecurityanalysis.Ourconstructiongeneralises
the approach taken by Maurer and Yacobi [25–27] to arbitrary TDL groups and provably
ﬁxes the ﬂaws in these earlier schemes by appropriate use of hashing.
We then explore the relationship between IBE and ID-NIKD. We give a conversion that
takes an ID-NIKD scheme that is secure in our model and that satisﬁes some mild technical
conditions, and produces from it an IBE scheme that is secure in the IND-ID-CPA security
model of [6]. The conversion itself works in the standard model. Chosen-ciphertext security
in the random oracle model can easily be obtained by applying a secondary conversion, for
exampletheconversionsof[20,38].OurID-NIKD-to-IBEconversionprovidesaframework
within which existing ID-NIKD and IBE schemes can be related. For example, our conver-
sion allows us to build an IBE scheme from the above-mentioned ID-NIKD scheme based
on TDL groups. It also allows us to show how the Boneh–Franklin IBE scheme [6]a r i s e s
from the ID-NIKD scheme of Sakai et al. [33]. Thus these quite different IBE schemes can
beseentoariseinauniformwayfromasingleconstructionappliedtowell-knownID-NIKD
schemes.
Finally, we investigate the ID-NIKD and IBE schemes that result when these construc-
tions are instantiated in two different candidate TDL groups. The ﬁrst instantiation yields
provably secure ID-NIKD and IBE schemes for the RSA setting that was introduced by
MaurerandYacobi.Securityfortheseschemesis directly relatedtothe hardnessoffactoring
the RSA modulus. The ID-NIKD scheme can be seen as a provably secure version of the
Maurer-Yacobi scheme, while the IBE scheme appears to be new. The second instantiation
usesaTDLgroupconstructionthatisbasedoncombiningWeildescentanddisguisingcertain
elliptic curves via isogenies. This approach to constructing TDL groups was ﬁrst sketched in
[14] and fully developed in [36], but the application to identity-based cryptography is new.
Security for the resulting ID-NIKD and IBE schemes depends on the hardness of the CDH
problem for a particular class of elliptic curves.
At an 80-bit security level, our two IBE schemes are quite practical, the only issue being
that private key generation is rather expensive for the TA. For example, for the IBE scheme
built from elliptic curves and isogenies, the TA faces a one-time setup cost of about 248
bit operations, after which individual private key extractions are straightforward. This IBE
scheme operates on general elliptic curves deﬁned over F2161, enjoys compact public param-
eters and private keys, and has fast encryption and decryption. Thus we obtain IBE schemes
whose security is not based on hardness assumptions in pairing-friendly groups and whose
implementation does not require expensive pairing calculations. These characteristics make
our new schemes ideal for use in applications where the TA can be assumed to have large
amounts of computational power (such as government or military settings), but where the
clients who perform encryption and decryption operations are constrained (as is the case in,
for example, sensor networks or mobile ad hoc networks).
1.2 Related work
MurakamiandKasahara[29]recentlyreexaminedtheMaurer–Yacobiapproachtoconstruct-
ingID-NIKDschemesintheRSAtrapdoordiscretelogsetting.Theygaveacarefulexposition
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of the options for constructing schemes and emphasized the need for appropriate hashing to
avoid the square root attacks that plague the Maurer–Yacobi schemes. However, their paper
does not contain any formal security analysis and does not consider IBE schemes. In fact, we
will establish the security of one of the ID-NIKD schemes from [29] in this paper. In [22],
Kunihiro et al. also revisited the Maurer–Yacobi approach and considered its practicality.
However, they studied only versions of the Maurer–Yacobi schemes already known to be
insecure.
We are not aware of previous work pointing out the relationship between ID-NIKD and
IBE. Indeed, these two different primitives are sometimes confused in the literature. In the
particular case of the ID-NIKD scheme of Sakai et al. [33] and the Boneh–Franklin IBE
scheme [6], it has been noted by many authors that the same algebraic setting and keying
method is used. But, as far as we are aware, their exact relationship has not been clariﬁed
until now. The fact that ID-NIKD schemes are known to be useful in constructing other
cryptographic primitives is evident from [37,8,1], for example.
Several papers [17,19,30] sketch how TDL groups can be used to build ID-NIKD or IBE
schemes. But to our knowledge, none of the previous work properly formalises this idea, nor
provides any security analysis. In this sense some of our constructions and security results
can be regarded as formalising folklore using the techniques of provable security. More gen-
erally, the utility of TDL groups in cryptography is widely acknowledged—see for example
[31,12]. Teske [36] suggests the use of TDL groups for escrowed encryption applications:
each user selects his own public key and provides the relevant trapdoor information to the
escrow authority. A virtue is then made of the fact that solving the DLP is not easy for the
authority—this prevents the agency from decrypting individual user’s communications too
easily. In our application of the ideas of [14,36] to IBE, we use a single TDL group G as
part of the public parameters, and then exploit the fact that many discrete logs in G can be
extracted relatively cheaply after a significant pre-computation. We note that no mention of
ID-based applications is made in [14,36].
Rivest [32] outlines a construction for IBE based on the existence of trapdoor groups
with infeasible inverses (TGIIs) that is attributed to Vaikuntanathan, and asks whether this
is the only known sufﬁcient condition for IBE outside of bilinear maps (i.e. pairing-friendly
groups). Our work, in particular our construction of IBE from any TDL group in which the
CDHproblemishardandforwhichhashingontothegroupispossible,answersthisquestion.
Moreover, in both of our concrete constructions, taking inverses in the relevant group is easy,
showing that the notion of a TDL group is distinct from that of a TGII. Indeed, there do not
currently appear to be any good candidates for TGIIs.
Several authors [18,23] have considered the construction of IBE schemes secure against
collusions involving a limited number of participants. The beneﬁt of their approach is that
any group in which DDH is hard can be used, but the drawback is that the schemes are not
secureintheacceptedsecuritymodelforIBE[6].Moreover,thecomplexityoftheencryption
anddecryptionalgorithmsoftheschemesislinearink,thethresholdofcheatingparticipants
that can be tolerated.
2 Background and definitions
In this section, we provide basic definitions needed for the remainder of the paper.
Deﬁnition 1 (Trapdoor discrete log generator) A trapdoor discrete log group generator
(TDL group generator) is deﬁned by a pair algorithms TDLGen and SolveDL:
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– TDLGen:Analgorithmthattakesasecurityparameter1k asinputandoutputs(G,r,g,T)
whereG isa(descriptionofa)cyclicgroupofsomeorderr withgeneratorgandT denotes
trapdoor information.
– SolveDL:Apolynomial-timealgorithmwhichtakesasinput1k,(G,r,g,T)andagroup
element h and outputs a ∈ Zr such that h = ga.
Note that we do not insist that the orderr of the group G in the above definition be prime.
This allows us to handle both RSA and elliptic curve settings. In the RSA setting, r must
be kept secret by the party running the TDLGen algorithm, and, for technical reasons, we
will need to assume that a suitable bound R on the group order is available as part of the
description of G. We will see that a large multiple of the modulus N can play the role of R in
the RSA setting. When disclosure ofr does not impact on security we may includer directly
as part of the group description. For now we insist that SolveDL run in time polynomial in
k, but we will relax this in Sect.5 in order to handle situations where private key generation
may require time that is super-polynomial or even exponential in k, but that is still small
enough for practical application for speciﬁc values of k. In this situation, extra care would
need to be taken in the selection of scheme parameters to ensure that our security results to
follow remain meaningful in practice.
Deﬁnition 2 Let G with generator g be the output of algorithm TDLGen as in Definition 1.
We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Computational Difﬁe-Hellman
(CDH) problem in G to be
AdvCDH
A (k) = Pr(A(G,g,ga,gb) = gab)
where a,b
$
← Zr.
Deﬁnition 3 Let G with generator g be the output of algorithm TDLGen as in Definition 1.
We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Decisional Difﬁe-Hellman (DDH)
problem G to be
AdvDDH
A (k) =
1
2


Pr(A(G,g,ga,gb,gab) = 1) − Pr(A(G,g,ga,gb, Z) = 1)



where a,b
$
← Zr and Z
$
← G.
We also want to work with pairing-friendly groups, and introduce a second generator for
this setting:
Deﬁnition 4 A pairing-friendly group generator PairingGen is a polynomial time algo-
rithm with input 1k and output a tuple (G,GT,e,q, P).H e r eG,GT are groups of prime
order q, P generates G,a n de : G × G → GT is a bilinear, non-degenerate and efﬁciently
computable map. By convention, G is an additive group and GT multiplicative.
Foreaseofpresentation,weworkexclusivelyinthesettingwheree issymmetric;ourdef-
initions and results can be generalised to the asymmetric setting where e : G1 × G2 → GT,
with G1 and G2 being different groups. Further details concerning the basic choices that are
available when using pairings in cryptography can be found in [15].
Deﬁnition 5 We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Bilinear Difﬁe-Hell-
man (BDH) problem in (G,GT) to be
AdvBDH
A (k) = Pr(A(aP,bP,cP) = e(P, P)abc)
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where a,b,c
$
← Zq. Here, we implicitly assume that parameters (G,GT,e,q, P) are given
to A as additional inputs.
Deﬁnition 6 We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the Decisional Bilinear
Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) problem in (G,GT) to be:
AdvDBDH
A (k) =
1
2


Pr(A(aP,bP,cP,e(P, P)abc) = 1) − Pr(A(aP,bP,cP, Z) = 1)



where a,b,c
$
← Zq and Z
$
← GT.A g a i n ,w ea s s u m et h a tA has the expected additional
inputs.
Deﬁnition 7 A function  (k) is said to be negligible if, for every c, there exists kc such that
 (k) ≤ k−c for every k ≥ kc.
Deﬁnition 8 Considerafamilyoffunctions f = ( fk)k∈N where fk :{ 0,1}∗ → Tk forsome
set Tk.We deﬁne the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking the one-wayness of function
fk to be:
AdvOW
A (k) = Pr( fk(x) = y : x  $
←{ 0,1}∗, y = fk(x ),x ← A(y)).
Here, A is given a description of fk as part of its input.
The family ( fk)k∈N is said to be one-way if AdvOW
A (k) is a negligible function for all
algorithms A running in time polynomial in k.
3 ID-based non-interactive key distribution
We formally deﬁne an ID-based non-interactive key distribution (ID-NIKD) scheme by
three distinct algorithms: Setup, Extract and SharedKey. Algorithms Setup and
Extract are executed by the Trusted Authority (TA), while SharedKey can be executed
by any entity in possession of its private key and the identiﬁer of any other entity with which
it wishes to generate a shared key.
– Setup:Oninput1k,outputsamasterpublickey(orsystemparameters)mpkandmaster
secret key msk.
– Extract: On input mpk,msk and identiﬁer ID ∈{ 0,1}∗, returns a private key SID from
some space of private keys SK.
– SharedKey: On input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e ySIDA a n da ni d e n t i ﬁ e rIDB ∈{ 0,1}∗,w h e r e
IDB  = IDA, this algorithm returns a key KA,B from some space of shared keys SHK
speciﬁed in mpk.
We require that, for any pair of identities IDA,IDB, and corresponding private keys
SIDA, SIDB, SharedKey satisﬁes the constraint:
SharedKey(mpk, SIDA,IDB) = SharedKey(mpk, SIDB,IDA).
This ensures that entities A and B can indeed generate a shared key without any interaction.
We will normally assume that SHK, the space of shared keys, is {0,1}n(k) for some function
n(k). In practice, this can be arranged by hashing a “raw” key.
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3.1 Definition of security for ID-based non-interactive key distribution
Dupont and Enge [13] introduced the ﬁrst formal security model for ID-NIKD. We present
our new model, discuss a variant of it, and then explain how it strengthens the model of [13].
Our model is stated in terms of a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. C
takes as input the security parameter 1k, runs algorithm Setup of the ID-NIKD scheme and
gives A mpk. It keeps msk to itself. A then makes queries of the following three types:
– Extract(ID): C responds by running algorithm Extract of the ID-NIKD scheme with
input (mpk,msk,ID) to generate a private key SID. C gives SID to A.
– Reveal(IDA,IDB): C responds by running Extract(mpk,msk,IDA) to obtain a pri-
vate key SA and then SharedKey(mpk, SA,IDB) to generate a shared key KA,B. C
gives KA,B to A.
– Test(IDA,IDB): C responds by calculating KA,B as above. C then selects b
$
←{ 0,1}.I f
b = 0t h e nC gives KA,B to A;i fb = 1, then C gives A a random element from SHK.
A’s queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number, except that A is allowed
to make only one Test query. A straightforward hybrid argument can be used to relate our
model with a single Test query to a model allowing multiple Test queries for a ﬁxed bit b.
In our model, no query to the Reveal oracle is allowed on the pair of identities selected for
the Test query (in either order), and no Extract query is allowed on either of the identities
involved in the Test query. These last two conditions are necessary to prevent the adversary
from trivially winning the security game.
Finally, A outputs a bit b , and wins the game if b  = b. A’s advantage in this IND-SK
(indistinguishability of shared key) security game is deﬁned to be
AdvIND-SK
A (k) =

Pr[b = b ]−1/2

.
We say that an ID-NIKD scheme is IND-SK secure if for any polynomial time adversary A,
the function AdvIND-SK
A (k) is negligible.
A weaker “computational” version of this model can be obtained by removing the Test
oracle and changing the win condition for the game to require that A output the actual shared
key KA,B for two identities IDA,IDB neither of which is the subject of an Extract query,
and that are not together the subject of a Reveal query. We refer to COMP-SK security in
this case.
3.1.1 Comparison to the model of Dupont and Enge:
We detail a number of differences between our security model for ID-NIKD and that of
Dupont and Enge [13].
The model of [13] gives the adversary access to the Extract oracle, but not to a Reveal
oracle. Thus it captures collusion attacks, but does not give the adversary any direct oracle
access to shared keys. This is somewhat analogous to a “No Reveals” adversary that is some-
times considered in weak security models for (interactive) key exchange. This restriction
means that the model of [13] does not even capture the very natural requirement that the
adversary, even after capturing keys shared between some pairs of entities, should still not
be able to compute further shared keys. An adversary can, of course, compute any given
shared key after extracting the private key of one of the relevant entities. But the different
key types (private keys and shared keys) may be afforded different levels of protection in
practice, so differentiating between the different types of compromise that are possible gives
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us a more reﬁned model that may better represent real applications. For example, private
keys may be stored and used only in tamper-resistant hardware, while shared keys may be
used as transport keys and so be exposed to cryptanalysis or other forms of attack.
We note that, in our model, queries to the Reveal oracle can be simulated by making
appropriate access to the Extract oracle. This leads to a reduction from our security model
to a model in which the adversary does not have access to a Reveal oracle. However, this
reduction requires a correct guess as to which identities will be involved in the Test query,
implying that it is not tight.
The model of [13] requires the adversary to compute the shared key held between two
entities in order to be judged successful, whereas an indistinguishability-based definition is
stronger, and more closely aligned with existing models for key exchange. Thus the model
of [13] is analogous to our COMP-SK security model, though it is still weaker than even that
model since we provide access to a Reveal oracle.
Finally, for the avoidance of confusion, we note that no non-interactive key distribution
scheme can meet the notion of forward security that is enjoyed by many interactive key
distribution protocols.
3.2 ID-based non-interactive key distribution from trapdoor discrete log groups
We specify how to obtain an ID-NIKD scheme from any TDL group generator. We need to
assume the existence of efﬁcient hash functions H1 :{ 0,1}∗ → G and H2 : G →{ 0,1}n in
ourconstruction;thesearemodelledasrandomoraclesinoursecurityproof.Thecomponent
algorithms of our TDL-based ID-NIKD scheme are deﬁned as follows:
– Setup: On input 1k, this algorithm runs TDLGen of the TDL generator and obtains a
tuple (G,r,g,T). It outputs mpk = (G,g, H1, H2,n) where H1 :{ 0,1}∗ → G and
H2 : G →{ 0,1}n are hash functions, and SHK ={ 0,1}n. It also outputs msk =
(G,g, H1, H2,n,r,T).H e r en = n(k) will be the bit-length of shared keys in the
ID-NIKD scheme.
– Extract:Oninputmpk,mskandidentiﬁerID ∈{ 0,1}∗,thisalgorithmrunsalgorithm
SolveDL on input H1(ID) to obtain a value SID ∈ Zr such that gSID = H1(ID).T h e
algorithm then outputs SID.
– SharedKey: On input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e ySIDA a n da ni d e n t i ﬁ e rIDB ∈{ 0,1}∗,w h e r e
IDB  = IDA, this algorithm outputs H2(H1(IDB)SIDA) = H2(gSIDA SIDB) ∈{ 0,1}n
It is clear that SharedKey deﬁned in this way satisﬁes the requirement that entities A
and B are able to compute a common key. Note that g need not be included in the public
parameters. However, including it slightly simpliﬁes our later presentation.
Theorem 1 The TDL-based ID-NIKD scheme is secure assuming the hardness of the CDH
problem in groups G produced by the TDL group generator. In more detail, for any IND-SK
adversary A against the TDL-based ID-NIKD scheme that makesqi queries to hash function
Hi for i = 1,2, there is an algorithm B that solves the CDH problem in groups G produced
by the TDL group generator with
AdvCDH
B (k) ≥ AdvIND-SK
A (k)/q2
1q2.
Moreover, B runs in time O(time(A)). The proof is in the random oracle model, i.e. H1, H2
are modelled as random oracles.
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Proof SupposethereisanadversaryAagainsttheTDL-basedID-NIKDschemewithadvan-
tage   and running time t. We show how to construct an algorithm B that uses A to solve the
CDH problem in groups G produced by the TDL generator.    
B’s input is (G,g,ga,gb) where G is a cyclic group produced by TDLGen, g is a gener-
ator of G and (ga,gb) is an instance of the CDH problem in G. B’s task is to compute gab,
and it does this by acting as a challenger for A. We assume here that r, the group order, is
part of the description of G. After the proof, we sketch the modiﬁcations necessary to handle
the case where only a bound R on r is available.
B gives A mpk = (G,g, H1, H2,n) where H1 and H2 are random oracles controlled
by B.L e tq1 be a bound on the number of queries made to H1 by A in the course of its attack;
similarly let q2 be a bound on the number of queries made to H2. B chooses two distinct
indices I and J uniformly at random from {1,2,...,q1} and a third index L uniformly at
random from {1,2,...,q2}. A makes a series of queries which B answers as follows:
– H1 queries: B maintains a table to handle A’s H1 queries. If ID already appears in
an entry of the form (ID,c,h) in the table, then B returns h in response to A’s query.
Otherwise, if A’s i-th distinct query to H1 is on IDi,t h e nB proceeds as follows:
1. If i = I,t h e nB adds (IDI,⊥,ga) to the H1 table and returns ga.
2. If i = J,t h e nB adds (IDJ,⊥,gb) to the H1 table and returns gb.
3. Otherwise, B chooses ci uniformly at random from Zr, adds (IDi,ci,gci) to the H1
table, and returns gci.
B’s responses to H1 queries are uniformly and independently generated, so B’s simu-
lation of H1 is indistinguishable from that in the real attack environment. Notice how
knowledge of the group order r is used to ensure this.
– H2 queries: B maintains a table to handle A’s H2 queries. If the query s already appears
in an entry of the form (s, K) in the table, then B returns K in response to A’s query.
Otherwise, if A’s i-th distinct query to H2 is on si,t h e nB selects Ki
$
←{ 0,1}n, adds
(si, Ki)tothetable,andreturns Ki toA.Again,B’sresponsesto H2 queriesareuniformly
and independently generated.
– Extract queries: If A makes an query on an Extract identiﬁer ID,B ﬁrst makes an H1
query on ID if this has not already been done. If ID ∈{ IDI,IDJ} then B aborts the
simulation. Otherwise, B ﬁnds an entry (ID,c,h) in the H1 table and outputs c.
– Reveal queries: When A makes a Reveal query on a pair of identities {IDi,IDj},B
ﬁrst makes H1 queries on IDi and IDj if this has not already been done. If {IDi,IDj}=
{IDI,IDJ}thenBabortsthesimulation.Otherwise,suppose|{IDi,IDj}∩{IDI,IDJ}|≤ 1.
Then B can obtain from the H1 table two entries (IDi,ci,hi) and (IDj,cj,h j),w h e r e
eitherci  =⊥orcj  =⊥ .Ifci  =⊥ ,thenB respondswiththevalue H2(h
ci
j ),ﬁrstmaking
the H2 query if necessary. If cj  =⊥ ,t h e nB responds with the value H2(h
cj
i ),
– Test query: At some point during the simulation A makes a single Test query on a pair
of identities. If A does not choose IDI and IDJ as the identities in this query, then B
aborts its interaction with A and fails. Otherwise, B outputs a randomly generated value
K ∈{ 0,1}n. Notice that the “correct” key that would be computed by B in responding
to this query is equal to H2(gab).
This completes our description of B’s simulation. When A terminates by outputting a bit
b  (or if A exceeds its normal running time), then B outputs the value sL held in the L-th
entry of the H2 list.
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Wenowassess B’ssuccessprobability.Let F denotetheeventthat B isnotforcedtoabort
during its simulation and let G denote the event that a query to H2 on input gab is made at
some point during B’s simulation. It is easy to see that Pr(F) ≥ 1/q2
1, and that, conditioned
oneventF occurring,thenuptothepointwhereG occurs,B’ssimulationisindistinguishable
from that seen when A interacts with a true challenger. Moreover, if F occurs, but G does
not occur, then it is easy to see that A’s advantage is zero. For then the shared key that should
be held between the two identities involved in the Test query (namely IDI and IDJ) is equal
to H2(gab), and this is independent of A’s view unless event G occurs. Thus, conditioned on
F occurring, we have:
Pr[b = b |¬G]=
1
2
.
Hence, assuming event F o c c u r s ,w eh a v e
AdvIND-SK
A (k) =



Pr[b = b ]−
1
2




=



Pr[b = b |G]Pr[G]+Pr[b = b |¬G]Pr[¬G]−
1
2




=



Pr[b = b |G]Pr[G]+Pr[b = b |¬G](1 − Pr[G]) −
1
2




=



(Pr[b = b |G]−Pr[b = b |¬G])Pr[G]+Pr[b = b |¬G]−
1
2




≤ Pr[G]+



Pr[b = b |¬G]−
1
2




= Pr[G]
On the other hand, when events F and G do occur, B is successful in outputting gab with
probabilityatleast1/q2,sinceinthiscaseweknowthat gab isonthe H2 listinsomeposition,
and B selects as its output a random element from the list. Combining these facts, we see that
AdvCDH
B (k) ≥  /q2
1q2. This completes the proof.
The above proof uses B’s knowledge ofr to produce uniformly sampled elements from G
with known discrete logs. When only an upper bound R on r is available (because the group
order is hidden), B cannot so easily achieve this. However, if we place Zr by ZR wherever
it occurs in the proof, then B’s simulation of H1 deviates from being perfectly uniform by
a fraction of at most r/R, and this can be made negligibly small simply by increasing the
size of R. For example, in the RSA setting, we can take R = 2kN where 1k is the security
parameter and N the modulus. Although the private keys c returned by B to A as the result
of Extract queries are now no longer in Zr, they are still valid keys (satisfying gc = H1(ID)
in G). Strictly, the definition of the scheme should then be altered slightly to ensure that the
outputs of the Extract algorithm are also from ZR.    
A variant scheme whose security is based on the hardness of the DDH problem in the
TDL group is obtained simply by omitting the hash function H2, so that the shared key is
deﬁned to be the “raw” value gSASB ∈ G. We can obtain COMP-SK security based on the
hardness of the CDH problem in the TDL group for this variant scheme. The proofs of these
results use similar techniques as the proof of Theorem 1.
Our TDL-based ID-NIKD scheme presented here is a generalisation of the schemes given
in [25] from speciﬁc TDL groups in the RSA setting to the setting of general TDL groups.
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Aswenotedintheintroduction,theschemesof[25]andtheirsuccessors[26,27]lackformal
security analysis and all suffer from attacks of various kinds [24,21,29]. Our analysis above
shows that what is needed to prevent the various attacks on the Maurer–Yacobi ID-NIKD
schemes is the introduction of appropriate hash functions. We return to the issue of how
to select parameters and construct appropriate hash functions in Sect.5, where we examine
RSA-based instantiations of our TDL-based schemes. A scheme of this type in the setting
of anomalous elliptic curves over Zn w a sa l s os k e t c h e di n[ 30], but the speciﬁc scheme was
soon found to be insecure by the authors.
3.3 Security of the ID-NIKD scheme of Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara
In this section, we prove the security of the Sakai–Ohgishi–Kasahara (SOK) ID-NIKD
scheme [33] in our extended security model. This strengthens the main result of [13].
The SOK ID-NIKD scheme makes use of a pairing-friendly group generator Pairing-
Gen and has the following algorithms:
– Setup:Oninput1k,thisalgorithmrunsPairingGentoobtainatuple(G,GT,e,q, P)
with the usual properties. It selects s
$
← Zq and outputs mpk = (G,GT,e,q, P, P0 =
sP, H1, H2,n) where H1 :{ 0,1}∗ → G and H2 : GT →{ 0,1}n are hash functions,
and SHK ={ 0,1}n. It also outputs msk = s.
– Extract: On input mpk,msk and identiﬁer ID ∈{ 0,1}∗, this algorithm outputs SID =
sH 1(ID).
– SharedKey: On input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e ySIDA a n da ni d e n t i ﬁ e rIDB ∈{ 0,1}∗,w h e r e
IDB  = IDA, this algorithm outputs H2(e(SIDA, H1(IDB))) ∈{ 0,1}n.
It is clear from bilinearity of the map e that SharedKey deﬁned in this way satisﬁes
the requirement that entities A and B are able to compute a common key. It also should be
pointed out that Dupont and Enge [13] analyse a slight generalisation of the SOK ID-NIKD
scheme that operates in the more general setting of asymmetric pairings. Our analysis can
also be transferred to this setting. Note too that, strictly speaking, there is no need to include
the value P0 = sPin the public parameters of the scheme. However, including it simpliﬁes
our later presentation.
Theorem 2 The SOK ID-NIKD scheme is secure assuming the hardness of the BDH prob-
lem in groups (G,GT) produced by the pairing-friendly group generator PairingGen.I n
more detail, for any IND-SK adversary A against the SOK ID-NIKD scheme that makes qi
queriestohashfunction Hi fori = 1,2,thereisanalgorithm B thatsolvestheBDHproblem
in groups (G,GT) produced by PairingGen with
AdvBDH
B (k) ≥ AdvIND-SK
A (k)/q2
1q2.
Moreover, B runs in time O(time(A)). The proof is in the random oracle model, i.e. H1, H2
are modelled as random oracles.
Proof Suppose there is an adversary A against the SOK ID-NIKD scheme with advantage  
and running time t. We show how to construct an algorithm B that uses A to solve the BDH
problem in groups (G,GT) produced by PairingGen.
B’s input is (G,GT,e,q, P,aP,bP,cP) where G,GT are cyclic groups of prime order
q, P generates G,e : G × G → GT is a bilinear map, and (aP,bP,cP) is an instance of
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the BDH problem in G. B’s task is to compute e(P, P)abc, and it does this by acting as a
challenger for A.
B gives A mpk = (G,GT,e,q, P, P0 = cP, H1, H2,n) where H1 and H2 are random
oracles controlled by B.L e tq1 be a bound on the number of queries made to H1 by A
in the course of its attack; similarly let q2 be a bound on the number of queries made to
H2. B chooses two distinct indices I and J uniformly at random from {1,2,...,q1} and a
third index L uniformly at random from {1,2,...,q2}. A makes a series of queries which B
answers as follows:
– H1 queries: B maintains a table to handle A’s H1 queries. If ID already appears in
an entry of the form (ID,d,h) in the table, then B returns h in response to A’s query.
Otherwise, if A’s i-th distinct query to H1 is on IDi,t h e nB proceeds as follows:
1. If i = I,t h e nB adds (IDI,⊥,aP) to the H1 table and returns aP.
2. If i = J,t h e nB adds (IDJ,⊥,bP) to the H1 table and returns bP.
3. Otherwise, B chooses di uniformly at random from Zq, adds (IDi,di,di P) to the
H1 table, and returns di P.
B’s responses to H1 queries are uniformly and independently generated.
– H2 queries: B maintains a table to handle A’s H2 queries. If the query s already appears
in an entry of the form (s, K) in the table, then B returns K in response to A’s query.
Otherwise, if A’s i-th distinct query to H2 is on si,t h e nB selects a random element
Ki from G, adds (si, Ki) to the table, and returns Ki to A.A g a i n ,B’s responses to H2
queries are uniformly and independently generated.
– Extract queries: If A makes an Extract query on an identiﬁer ID,B ﬁrst makes an H1
query on ID if this has not already been done. If ID ∈{ IDI,IDJ} then B aborts the
simulation. Otherwise, B ﬁnds an entry (ID,d,h) in the H1 table and outputs d(cP).
– Reveal queries: When A makes a Reveal query on a pair of identities {IDi,IDj},B ﬁrst
makes H1 queries on IDi and IDj if this has not already been done. If {IDi,IDj}=
{IDI,IDJ} then B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, suppose |{IDi,IDj}∩{IDI,IDJ}| ≤
1. Then B can obtain from the H1 table two entries (IDi,di,hi) and (IDj,dj,h j),w h e r e
either di  =⊥or dj  =⊥ .I fdi  =⊥ ,t h e nB responds with the value H2(e(h j,di(cP))),
ﬁrst making the H2 query if necessary. If cj  =⊥ ,t h e nB responds with the value
H2(e(hi,dj(cP))).
– Test query: At some point during the simulation A makes a single Test query on a
pair of identities. If A does not choose IDI and IDJ as the identities in this query, then
B aborts its interaction with A and fails. Otherwise, B outputs a randomly generated
value K ∈{ 0,1}n. Notice that because of the way in which the simulation is set up,
the “correct” key that would be computed by B in responding to this query is equal to
H2(e(P, P)abc).
This completes our description of B’s simulation. When A terminates by outputting a bit
b  (or if A exceeds its normal running time), then B outputs the value sL held in the L-th
entry of the H2 list. Then the assessment of B’s success probability is almost identical to that
in the proof of Theorem 1, and we omit the details.    
A variant scheme whose security is based on the hardness of the DBDH problem is
obtained simply by omitting the hash function H2, so that the shared key is deﬁned to be the
“raw” value e(SIDA, H1(IDB)) ∈ GT. We can also obtain COMP-SK security based on the
hardness of the BDH problem for this variant scheme.
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4 From ID-based non-interactive key distribution to identity-based encryption
We show how to construct an IBE scheme from any ID-NIKD scheme that meets two addi-
tionaltechnicalconditions.WewillthenshowthatiftheID-NIKDschemeisIND-SKsecure,
then the IBE scheme that results from our conversion is IND-ID-CPA secure in the sense
of [6]. We note here that we think that a generic construction in the reverse direction is
unlikely to be possible, since it seems difﬁcult to obtain a non-interactive primitive from one
that is intrinsically interactive. A KEM formulation of our construction is also possible. In
some ways this would be a more natural approach to take, since both ID-NIKD schemes and
KEMs are concerned with keys, and one can generically obtain IBE from suitable KEMs
usingresultsof[4].However,weareinterestedinexploringtherelationshipbetweenexisting
ID-NIKD and IBE schemes, and so have focussed here on an IBE formulation instead.
We begin by recalling the formal definitions of IBE and its security, then give our con-
version.
An IBE scheme is deﬁned in terms of four algorithms:
– Setup:Oninput1k,outputsamasterpublickey(orsystemparameters)mpkandmaster
secret key msk.
– Extract: On input mpk,msk and identiﬁer ID ∈{ 0,1}∗, returns a private key SID.
– Encrypt: On input mpk, identiﬁer ID ∈{ 0,1}∗ and message M (from some message
space), returns a ciphertext C.
– Decrypt: On input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e ySID and a ciphertext C, returns either a message
M or a failure symbol ⊥.
We have the obvious correctness requirement that decryption “undoes” encryption.
SecuritymodelsforIBEwereﬁrstestablishedin[6].Chosen-ciphertextsecurityisdeﬁned
in terms of the following IND-ID-CCA game between an adversary A and a challenger C. C
takes as input the security parameter 1k, runs algorithm Setup of the IBE scheme and gives
Ampk. It keeps msk to itself. A then runs in two phases:
– Phase 1: A issues a series of adaptively selected Extract and Decrypt queries on iden-
tities ID and identiﬁer/ciphertext combinations (ID,C) of its choice. These are replied
to by C by using algorithms Extract and Decrypt and knowledge of msk.
– Challenge:AfterAdecidestoendPhase1,itoutputstwoequallengthmessages M0, M1
andachallengeidentiﬁerID∗.Cselectsb
$
←{ 0,1},setsC∗ = Encrypt(mpk,ID∗, Mb)
and gives C∗ to A. We require that ID∗ not be the subject of any Extract query in
Phase 1.
– Phase 2: This phase proceeds as in Phase 1, with the constraints that ID∗ not be the sub-
ject of any Extract query and that the pair (ID∗,C∗) not be the subject of any Decrypt
query.
– Guess: Finally A outputs a bit b  ∈{ 0,1}.
The advantage of A against the IBE scheme in the above IND-ID-CCA security game is
deﬁned to be:
AdvIND-ID-CCA
A (k) =



Pr[b = b ]−
1
2




where the probability is measured over the random choices of coins of A and C.A nI B E
scheme is said to be IND-ID-CCA secure if AdvIND-ID-CCA
A (k) is negligible for all polyno-
mial time adversaries A.
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AweakernotionofIND-ID-CPAsecurityforIBEisobtainedbyremovingtheadversary’s
access to the Decrypt oracle. The advantage of A against the IBE scheme in the resulting
IND-ID-CPA security game is deﬁned to be:
AdvIND-ID-CPA
A (k) =



Pr[b = b ]−
1
2




and an IBE scheme is said to be IND-ID-CPA secure if AdvIND-ID-CPA
A (k) is negligible for
all polynomial time adversaries A.
4.1 The conversion
Wearenowready topresent ourconversionfrom ID-NIKD toIBE. Werequirethe ID-NIKD
scheme to satisfy the following requirements:
–T h e Extract and SharedKey algorithms of the ID-NIKD scheme should, as a ﬁrst
step, hash the input identiﬁer ID using a member h = hk of a one-way hash function
family (hk)k∈N to produce an element UID in some set PK, with all further computations
in the Extract and SharedKey algorithms depending only on UID and not on ID.
We assume that h is described in the public parameters of the scheme.We may think of
UID as being the public key corresponding to the string ID. If this condition is satisﬁed,
then, from the algorithm SharedKey with inputs mpk, SIDA,IDB we can construct a
new algorithm SharedKey  with inputs mpk, SIDA,UIDB = h(IDB) that has the same
output as SharedKey.
– There should exist a randomized algorithm Sample that on input mpk, outputs pairs
(S,U) ∈ SK × PK with S being a private key corresponding to public key U and
U
$
← PK. Note that an identiﬁer corresponding to U will not be obtainable from U
when it is generated in this way without inverting the one-way hash function h.
TheseconditionsarecertainlysatisﬁedfortheTDL-basedandtheSOKID-NIKDschemes
considered in Sect.3. We do not know of any other ID-NIKD schemes. In both schemes, a
hash function H1 is ﬁrst used to convert identiﬁers into group elements before any further
processing.Modelling H1 asarandomoracleinthesecurityanalysisisastrongerassumption
than H1 being one-way. For the second condition for the TDL-based scheme, we can deﬁne
Sampleassetting S
$
← Zr andU = gS.Ifr isnotpartofmpk,wemaysetS
$
← ZR instead.
FortheSOKscheme,wecandeﬁneSampleassettingb
$
← Zq, S = bP 0 andU = bP.Here
we see the need for including g and P0 in the public parameters of the ID-NIKD schemes.
Assuming these two conditions are met for an ID-NIKD scheme S, we construct an IBE
scheme IBE(S) as follows:
– Setup: On input 1k, this algorithm runs the Setup of S (with the same input) to obtain
mpk,msk. The master public key of IBE(S) is set to mpk and the master secret key is
set to msk. We assume that mpk contains a description of the shared key space SHK,
and that SHK ={ 0,1}n; this will also deﬁne the message space of IBE(S).
– Extract:Oninput(mpk,msk,ID),thisalgorithmrunsthe Extractalgorithmofthe
ID-NIKD scheme S with the same input to obtain a private key SID. The output is SID.
– Encrypt: Let the input be mpk,ID, M ∈{ 0,1}n. This algorithm runs Sample to
obtain a pair (S,U). It then runs SharedKey of scheme S on input (mpk, S,ID) to
obtain a key K ∈{ 0,1}n. The output is C = (U,V) where V = M ⊕ K.
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– Decrypt: Let the input be (mpk, SID,C) with C = (U,V). This algorithm runs
SharedKey  (derived from SharedKey of S) on input (mpk, SID,U) to obtain a
key K. The output is M = V ⊕ K.
Note that the Setup and Extract algorithms of the IBE scheme IBE(S) are almost
identical to those of the ID-NIKD scheme S. The main idea of the construction is that
the encrypting party A can generate an “on-the-ﬂy” key-pair (S,U) for each encryption to
B; running SharedKey(mpk, S,IDB) allows A to generate a shared key with B having
identiﬁer IDB, and sending the public key U to B as part of the ciphertext allows B to com-
pute the same shared key by running SharedKey (mpk, SIDB,U). This shared key is then
used to protect the message. This can be seen as an identity-based analogue of the classical
conversionthatturnstheDifﬁe-HellmankeyagreementprotocolintotheElGamalencryption
scheme.
The scheme can be generalised to handle an ID-NIKD scheme whose shared key space
SHK is any set equipped with a group operation; messages are then constrained to also lie
in SHK. Alternatively, the key K produced during Encrypt can be used to derive a key for
a symmetric encryption scheme. We have the following security result:
Theorem 3 Suppose the ID-NIKD scheme S is IND-SK secure and satisﬁes the two condi-
tions above. Suppose also that (hk)k∈N used in the construction of S is a one-way function
family. Then the IBE scheme IBE(S) is IND-ID-CPA secure. More precisely, for any adver-
sary A against IBE(S), there are adversaries B1 against the one-wayness of (hk) and B2
against the IND-SK security of S such that:
AdvIND-ID-CPA
A (k) ≤ AdvOW
B1 (k) + 2 · AdvIND-SK
B2 (k).
Here, B1,B2 have running time roughly the same as A.
Proof Let A be an adversary against IBE(S) and let AdvIND-ID-CPA
A (k) denote its advan-
tage.WeconstructfromAtwodistinctalgorithmsB1,B2.AlgorithmB1 attemptstobreakthe
one-wayness of hash function h, while algorithm B2 attempts to break the ID-NIKD scheme.
The subsequent joint analysis of these two algorithms will then give us our result.
B1 receives from its challenger C1 av a l u eU ∈ PK and uses A in an attempt to ﬁnd a
string ID  ∈{ 0,1}∗ such that h(ID ) = U. Clearly, if B1 is successful, then it breaks the
one-wayness of h. B1 runs Setup of the scheme IBE(S), obtaining msk,mpk.N o t et h a t
h is assumed to be described in mpk.N o wB1 gives mpk to A. B1 handles A’s Extract
queries using its knowledge of msk to run algorithm Extract of IBE(S). When A sub-
mits challenge messages M0, M1 and a challenge identiﬁer ID∗,B1 sets C∗ = (U,V) where
V = Mb ⊕ K and K = SharedKey (mpk, SID∗,U). Here, SID∗ is obtained by running
Extract and b
$
←{ 0,1}. Eventually A outputs its bit b . If at any point in the game, A
made a query to its Extract oracle on an identiﬁer ID satisfying h(ID) = U,t h e nB1 now
outputs ID.I fID∗ satisﬁes h(ID∗) = U,t h e nB1 outputs ID∗. Otherwise, B1 fails when A
outputs its bit. It is clear that the attack environment provided by B1 to A is indistinguishable
fromthatprovidedbyarealchallenger.Moreover,ifAdoesatanypointmakeaquery(either
an Extract query or during the challenge phase) involving an identiﬁer ID  ∈{ 0,1}∗ such
that h(ID ) = U,t h e nB1 breaks the one-wayness of h.
B2 receives from its challenger C2 the public parameters mpk of the ID-NIKD scheme
S and uses A in an attempt to win against C2 in the IND-SK security game for S.L e td
denote the hidden bit used by C2 in responding to B2’s Test query. B2 begins by selecting
ID  $
←{ 0,1}∗ and computing U = h(ID ). B2 then passes mpk to A. A’s Extract queries
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on identiﬁers ID are handled by B2 by passing them to C2 as Extract queries in the IND-SK
game.Ho we v er ,ifh(ID) = U foranyofthesequeries,then B2 aborts.When Asubmitschal-
lengemessages M0, M1 andachallengeidentiﬁerID∗,B2 makesitsTest querytoC2 oninput
(ID ,ID∗), receiving a value K in return. B2 then selects b
$
←{ 0,1} and sets C∗ = (U,V)
where V = Mb ⊕ K.H o w e v e r ,i fh(ID∗) = U,t h e nB2 aborts. Eventually A outputs its
bit b .I fb  = b then B2 outputs bit d  = 0; otherwise B2 outputs d  = 1. The attack envi-
ronment provided by B2 to A is indistinguishable from that provided by a real challenger,
provided that B2 does not abort. Moreover, when B2 does not abort, B2 makes only legal
queries to its challenger C2 – we can be sure that ID  is distinct from ID∗ and that ID  is not
involvedinanyExtractquery.Inthissituation, B2’sadvantagecan,viaastandardargument,
be expressed as:
AdvIND-SK
B2 (k) =
1
2

Pr[d  = 0|d = 0]−Pr[d  = 0|d = 1]

.
When d = 1, the key K returned by C2 to B2 as a result of the Test query is random in
SHK ={ 0,1}n, and then the ciphertext C∗ received by A is independent of the bit b. Hence
in this case, A has zero advantage and Pr[b = b ]=1/2. So Pr[d  = 0|d = 1]=1/2.
On the other hand, when d = 0, the key K returned by C2 to B2 is equal to the shared key
for identiﬁers ID ,ID∗, and hence C∗ is a proper encryption of Mb.T h e nP r [d  = 0|d =
0]=Pr[b = b |¬F],w h e r eF denotes the event that B2 aborts and ¬F its complement.
Combining this information, we obtain
AdvIND-SK
B2 (k) =
1
2
·

Pr[b = b |¬F]−1/2

.
Notice that A’s view is identical when playing against either B1 or B2, unless B2 aborts.
So the occurrence of F is independent of which algorithm A plays against. Notice too that
if F occurs, then B1 successfully inverts h.T h e nw eh a v e
AdvIND-ID-CPA
A (k) =

Pr[b = b ]−1/2


=

Pr[b = b |F]·Pr[F]+Pr[b = b |¬F]·(1 − Pr[F]) − 1/2


=

(Pr[b = b |F]−Pr[b = b |¬F]) · Pr[F]+Pr[b = b |¬F]−1/2


≤ Pr[F]+

Pr[b = b |¬F]−1/2


= AdvOW
B1 (k) + 2 · AdvIND-SK
B2 (k).
This, together with the observation that the running times of B1 and B2 are roughly the same
as that of A, completes the proof.    
The above construction provides only IND-ID-CPA security for the scheme IBE(S).I n
the random oracle model, we may apply the generic conversions of [20,38]t oo b t a i na nI B E
scheme with IND-ID-CCA security, provided IBE(S) satisﬁes a mild technical condition
(γ-uniformity). The resulting scheme (using either conversion) will be only a little less efﬁ-
cient than IBE(S). In turn, IBE(S) has roughly the same performance characteristics as the
ID-NIKD scheme that it is built from. In fact, the generic conversion of [38] only requires a
one-waysecuritynotionforthestartingIBEschemeinordertoobtainIND-ID-CCAsecurity.
We can achieve this notion of security for our ID-NIKD-to-IBE conversion under the weaker
requirement that the ID-NIKD scheme be COMP-SK secure. This can allow a slightly more
efﬁcient overall construction for an IND-ID-CCA secure IBE scheme, since we can typically
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obtain COMP-SK security using one less hash function than is needed for IND-SK security,
and with a slightly tighter reduction. Moreover, it can be seen from the proof of Theorem 3
that no access to the Reveal oracle is needed during the simulation. This means that security
in the weaker model for ID-NIKD originally proposed in [13] is actually sufﬁcient for our
application to IBE.
In the next sections, we will examine some speciﬁc IBE schemes that result from our
conversion.
4.2 Applying the conversion
We have already explained how the TDL-based ID-NIKD scheme and the SOK ID-NIKD
scheme meet the requirements for our conversion to be applicable.
In the TDL case, we obtain an IBE scheme with the following algorithms:
– Setup: On input 1k, this algorithm runs TDLGen of the TDL generator and obtains a
tuple (G,r,g,T). It outputs mpk = (G,g, H1, H2,n) where H1 :{ 0,1}∗ → G and
H2 : G →{ 0,1}n are hash functions. It also outputs msk = (G,g, H1, H2,n,r,T).
Here n is the size of plaintext messages.
– Extract:Oninputmpk,mskandidentiﬁerID ∈{ 0,1}∗,thisalgorithmrunsalgorithm
SolveDL on input H1(ID) to obtain a value SID ∈ Zr such that gSID = H1(ID).T h e
algorithm then outputs SID.
– Encrypt: On input mpk, identiﬁer ID ∈{ 0,1}∗ and message M, this algorithm returns
a ciphertext C = (U,V) where S
$
← Zr,U = gS and V = M ⊕ H2(H1(ID)S).
– Decrypt: On input mpk,ap r i v a t ek e ySID and a ciphertext C = (U,V), this algorithm
outputs M = V ⊕ H2(U SID).
TheIND-ID-CPA security ofthis IBE schemeis guaranteedbyTheorems1and3,assum-
ing the hardness of the CDH problem in groups G produced by TDLGen. The scheme is an
ID-based analogue of the ElGamal encryption scheme; indeed it can be constructed and its
security analysed directly without going via our ID-NIKD-to-IBE conversion. However, we
are not aware of this IBE scheme having been explicitly presented in the literature before.
Avariantofitwithoutexplicithashfunctionsandwithoutanysecurityanalysiswassketched
in [19]. We will explore speciﬁc instantiations of this TDL-based scheme in more detail in
the next section.
In the SOK case, it is easy to see that the IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme that results
from applying our conversion is nothing other than the BasicIdent IBE scheme of Boneh and
Franklin [6]: sampling produces a pair S = bP 0 and U = bP, and the ciphertext has the
form C = (U,V) where V = M ⊕ H2(e(S, H1(ID))). Here,
e(S, H1(ID)) = e(bP 0, H1(ID)) = e(bP,sH 1(ID)) = e(U,sH 1(ID)) = e(U, SID),
showing how the recipient may perform decryption.
Thus our approach provides a “new” proof of security for this scheme (and since the
IND-ID-CCA secure scheme FullIdent of [6] is effectively obtained via the later generic
conversion of [38], a proof for FullIdent too). More importantly, our conversion demon-
strates how seemingly quite different IBE schemes can be seen as arising in a uniform way
from a common underlying primitive, namely ID-NIKD. Specifically, it explains in a new
way the relationship between the SOK ID-NIKD scheme and the IBE schemes of Boneh and
Franklin [6].
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5 Instantiating the TDL-based schemes
In this section, we consider two different instantiations of our TDL-based ID-NIKD and IBE
schemes. Since the relevant schemes are already described and proved secure in Sects.3.2
and 4.2 in the context of general TDL groups, our focus here is on two different propos-
als for such groups. In both cases, the algorithm SolveDL no longer runs in polyno-
mial time, but its execution represents a still feasible if challenging computation. How-
ever, this means that the groups no longer strictly comply with the formal definition of a
TDL group in Sect.2. This in turn means that care is needed in selecting security param-
eters so as to obtain schemes that are efﬁcient for the TA and still secure against well-
equipped adversaries. In much the same way as in, for example, the well-known paper
of Boneh and Franklin [6], we do not seek to use the security results from Sects.3.2 and
4.2 to directly perform a concrete security analysis. Instead, as in [6], we use the hard-
ness of the identiﬁed computational problem as a guide to selecting parameters. In our
case, this problem is the CDH problem in the relevant TDL group. If a concrete security
analysis is desired, then the “cost” (in terms of looseness) of the security reductions in
Theorems 1 and 3 must be taken into account. This will necessitate the selection of differ-
ent security parameters, which will in turn impact on the efﬁciency and practicality of the
schemes.
5.1 The RSA setting
We present and evaluate an instantiation of a TDL group generator for the RSA setting. Our
presentation borrows in part from [29] (but note that [29] contains only a heuristic security
analysis). We assume the reader is familiar with basic number theory and algorithms for
factorisation and discrete logs. See [28] for further background.
Let N = pq where p = 3m o d4 ,q = 1 mod 4 and gcd(p − 1,q − 1) = 2. Then the
maximal order of any element in Z∗
N is (p − 1)(q − 1)/2. For x ∈ ZN,l e t( x
N ) denote the
Jacobi symbol. Let g be an element of Z∗
N such that gp = g mod p is primitive in Zp and
gq = g mod q is primitive in Zq.T h e ng has maximal order in Z∗
N and (
g
N ) = 1. Let G
denote the subgroup of Z∗
N generated by g; G will be our trapdoor discrete log group. We
next explain how to hash onto G, and then discuss how to select p and q in order to build a
trapdoor for extracting discrete logs in G.
It is easy to verify that G is exactly the set of all elements of ZN with Jacobi symbol 1.
Moreover, from the choice of p and q,w eh a v e(−1
N ) =− 1. Let H be a hash function from
{0,1}∗ onto ZN, and deﬁne
H1(ID) =

H(ID)
N

· H(ID).
Since −1 has Jacobi symbol −1i nZ∗
N, we see that outputs of H1 have Jacobi symbol 1,
and so lie in G (unless a hash output lying in ZN\Z∗
N can be found, in which case N can
be factored). If H :{ 0,1}∗ → ZN is modelled as a random oracle, then H1 is a random
oracle with output in G. In practice, it is easy to instantiate H with output in ZN using a hash
function such as SHA-256.
We next discuss in more detail how p and q should be chosen in order to obtain a suitable
trapdoor for the DLP. With the information p and q, discrete logs can be extracted in G by
ﬁnding discrete logs in Zp and Zq and combining the results using Chinese remaindering.
The idea, as originally sketched in [25], is to choose p and q so that p − 1a n dq − 1a r e
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both B-smooth, where B is some bound to be determined. Then the Pohlig-Hellman algo-
rithm can be combined with Pollard’s rho algorithm to ﬁnd discrete logs in Zp and Zq in
time roughly O( B1/2) where   is the number of prime factors in p − 1a n dq − 1, using
essentially no storage. This algorithm can be parallelised. Now consider the case when the
trapdoor information is not known. It is shown in [27, Lemma 2] that extracting discrete
logs to the base g in this situation is at least as difﬁcult as factoring N. On the other hand
when N is large enough, the best known algorithm for factoring N will either be the Number
Field Sieve (with running time LN(1/3,c) for some constant c)o rP o l l a r d ’ sp −1 factoring
algorithm. The latter algorithm requires running time O(B log N/log B) if p −1a n dq −1
are both B-smooth and if both do have a prime factor of size comparable to B. It does not
seem to be capable of parallelisation.
Thus we see that, provided N is chosen so that the Number Field Sieve is not effec-
tive, solving the DLP in G with the trapdoor information takes time O( B1/2) while,
without the trapdoor information, time O(B log N/log B) is needed. Roughly speaking,
then, with the trapdoor, ﬁnding discrete logs takes time 2k, and without it, time 22k,f o r
some value k that can be selected at will. This gives us the basis of a trapdoor for the
DLP in our group G, albeit where knowledge of the trapdoor only gives a square-root
speed-up rather than a polynomial-time algorithm for discrete logs. For example, sup-
pose N = pq with p and q as above has 1024 bits and B = 280. Then the NFS has
complexity roughly 280 operations, as does Pollard’s p − 1 algorithm. So without the
trapdoor, the DLP in G takes effort roughly 280, while with the trapdoor, it takes effort
roughly 240.
The above discussion can be formalised in the form of a trapdoor discrete log gener-
ator. Applying our constructions, we obtain concrete ID-NIKD and IBE schemes that are
provably secure in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the CDH prob-
lem in the group G consisting of elements in ZN with Jacobi symbol 1. It is known that
the CDH problem in this group is at least as hard as factoring (see [28, Fact 3.80]). This
security guarantee is, to the best of our knowledge, in contrast to all previously presented
versions of these schemes. The IBE scheme is fairly efﬁcient, with encryption requiring
two exponentiations modulo N and decryption requiring one. Public parameters and pri-
vate keys are compact. However, private key extraction is somewhat inefﬁcient, requiring
about 240 effort for each private key at the 80-bit security level. This is because, with the
Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard rho algorithms, it does not seem possible to re-use any of the
effort expended in extracting one log to ﬁnd another. On the other hand, this effort can be
spread across multiple processors and is storage-free. Re-use of effort would be possible
if one instead used an index-calculus style algorithm for discrete logs in Zp and Zq.F o r
parameters of practical interest, this would effectively trade a large pre-computation of the
order of L p(1/3,c) for rapid extraction of individual discrete logs thereafter. In our example
where p has roughly 512 bits, this pre-computation is significant but feasible. The factori-
sation of RSA-512 [10] took 8000 mips years using the Number Field Seive and one would
expect a roughly similar pre-computation cost for ﬁnding discrete logs in Zp with p having
512 bits.
Finally, we note that an alternative approach to constructing N using more than 2 prime
factors appears to give a greater asymmetry for the DLP with and without the trapdoor, at
least forparameters ofpractical interest. Analysis in [25]andmorerecently [22]proceedson
this basis. However, we do not know how to securely and efﬁciently hash onto a large cyclic
subgroupof Z∗
N inthatcase,andastheattacksonearlierID-NIKDinstantiations[25–27]and
oursecurityanalysisshow,properhashingisvitalforsecurity.Thusthisalternativeapproach
does not seem to be compatible with security.
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5.2 Trapdoor discrete logs from isogenies and weil descent
Galbraith et al. [14] proposed a method by which elliptic curves on which the DLP can
be solved using Weil descent can be disguised using isogenies to look like random curves.
Teske [36] developed these ideas, giving a more detailed complexity and security analysis.
In essence, the construction is as follows.
We start with a special elliptic curve E deﬁned over F2161 for which it is possible to
construct an explicit group homomorphism   from E into JC(F223), the Jacobian of a hy-
perelliptic curve of genus 7 or 8 deﬁned over F223.L e t P  of order r be a large cyclic
subgroup of the group of points on E, and assume P / ∈ ker( ). Then the DLP in G =  P 
may be transferred using   to JC(F223), where sub-exponential algorithms using index-cal-
culus techniques are available. It is estimated in [36, Sect. 2.2] that the DLP in JC(F223)
can be solved using around 248 bit operations, involving a factor base of size 222.M o s to f
this work can be parallelised. In fact, individual discrete log problems in JC(F223) can be
solved relatively easily once a pre-computation of this order of magnitude has been carried
out: each new problem requires the generation of an extra relation for the index-calculus
algorithm and a small amount of linear algebra. So, given that ﬁnding 222 relations takes
about 248 bit operations, ﬁnding each additional relation should take about a further 226 bit
operations.
Now from E we create a second elliptic curve E  having the same order as E by applying
a“randomwalkofisogenies”to E.Explicitalgorithmsforcalculatingthedeﬁningequations
of E  aregivenin[36].Thenewcurve E  isexpectedtobevulnerabletoaWeildescentattack
with very low probability, and indeed the best algorithm for solving the DLP in E  seems
most likely to be the Pollard rho method, with running time O(280) for this size of curve. It
is possible to compute an explicit representation of the chain of the isogenies which maps
E  back to E.L e t  denote the composition of the isogenies in this chain, and let P  ∈ E 
denote the pre-image of P under this map. Then the DLP in G  =  P   of order r can be
efﬁciently transferred into G using  , and thence to a feasible DLP in JC(F223) using  .
Theconstructionofatrapdoordiscreteloggroupinthissettingisnowstraightforward:the
trapdoor group is G  with generator P . Without the trapdoor, this appears to be a subgroup
of order r on a random curve over F2161 for which the most efﬁcient algorithm for solving
the DLP is the Pollard rho method. Detailed analysis supporting this statement can be found
in [36, Sect. 5]. The trapdoor information is the pair of maps ( , ). These can be used to
efﬁciently map the DLP in G  into JC(F223), where an index-calculus algorithm can be used
to solve the DLP.
Applying our ID-NIKD and IBE constructions in this setting gives us schemes that are
extremely efﬁcient in every respect except for private key extraction, and which carry proofs
of security based on the hardness of the CDH problem in G , giving roughly 80 bits of
security. To illustrate this efﬁciency claim further, consider the TDL-based IBE scheme of
Sect.4.2. Hashing onto elements (x, y) ∈ G  is straightforward. We may use an ordinary
hash function to map bitstrings ID onto elements x ∈ F2161. We then use an iterated approach
toobtainasuitablepointon E :werepeatedlyextendIDwithpreﬁxesandhashtoproducean
x-coordinate, until we can solve for y ∈ F2161 such that (x, y) ∈ E . The success probability
is roughly 1/2 on each iteration. Then we need to multiply by the co-factor |E |/r,w h i c h
can be arranged to be small, say 2 or 4 [36], to obtain an element of G . Each private key
is an element of Zr and can be represented using just 162 bits; public parameters are com-
pact, containing a description of E ,r and the generator P . Encryption (resp. decryption)
requires just 2 (resp. 1) point multiplications in E , together with some hashing. Thus these
operations are likely to be faster than in pairing-based schemes offering a similar security
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level. Ciphertexts (in the IND-ID-CPA secure scheme) have lengths the same as plaintexts
plus one group element, and so have an overhead of only 162 bits.
Aswehaveindicatedabove,privatekeyextraction,beingbasedonanindex-calculusstyle
algorithm, requires a pre-computation step during which many relations are gathered and a
large linear algebra computation to obtain a reduced matrix is carried out. After this step,
extracting individual private keys is fairly easy because each key needs only one additional
relationtobeproducedandthenasmallamountoflinearalgebra.Forthespeciﬁcparameters
in [36], the pre-computation cost can be estimated at about 248 bit operations, and the cost
of each private key extraction at about 226 bit operations. The pre-computation task can be
parallelised. Notice that this deployment scenario is rather different from the one envisaged
in [36]—there every individual generates his own curves E, E  and gives the trapdoor data
( , ) to an escrow agency, with the aim being to force the agency to expend considerable
effort to break each key.
6 Conclusion and open problems
WehaveexploredtherelationshipsbetweenID-NIKDandIBE,showinghowtheIBEscheme
ofBonehandFranklin[6]canbeseenasarisingfromtheID-NIKDschemeofSakaietal.[33].
WehavegivenconstructionsforsecureID-NIKDandIBEschemesinTDLgroups,andstud-
ied the instantiations of these schemes in two settings, the RSA-based setting of Maurer and
Yacobi, and the disguised elliptic curve setting of Galbraith et al. [14]a n dT e s k e[ 36]. We
obtained two provably secure IBE schemes with extremely attractive performance in every
respect except private key generation.
Several open problems are raised by our work. From a theoretical perspective, it would
be interesting to extend our constructions based on TDL groups to the hierarchical ID-
based setting and to ﬁnd constructions offering security in the standard model. It would
also be interesting to explore if further known IBE schemes can be related to (presumably
as yet unknown) ID-NIKD schemes. From a practical perspective, it would be nice to ﬁnd
an efﬁcient and secure way of hashing onto Z∗
N when N has more than two prime fac-
tors, since this would allow more ﬂexibility in parameter choices in the RSA setting. In
particular, this may allow us to make better use of index calculus algorithms in Zp for
each factor p, shifting most of the cost of private key extraction to a pre-computation.
One drawback of the disguised elliptic curve version of our TDL-based ID-NIKD and IBE
schemes is that the scheme parameters do not seem to scale smoothly to higher security
levels.
A closer examination of the techniques in [36] may reveal variations on this approach
with more attractive scaling properties. Of course, the most important question of all is to
ﬁnd examples of TDL groups for which solving the DLP with the trapdoor and hashing onto
the group are both easy. These would have many applications in cryptography.
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